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A Familiar Rhyme in Somalia

By BJ

While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been the main focus of the Bush administration’s “War on Terror”, there was a third war started in Somalia that continues to rage and go just as poorly for the US-backed Eithiopian-and-Somali-exile government as the others have. Most recently, the Islamists took control over the third largest city and a major port, Kismayo:

The reason given for starting the war in the Horn of Africa was much like that in Iraq, the claim that the Islamic Courts Union, which was consolidating control of southern Somalia from US-backed warlords, was said to be in close league with al Qaeda. It was a dubious claim at the time, but today I spotted this story in the LA Times, which posits that it may be more true today:

Conventional wisdom long held that Somalia was so inhospitable that even Al Qaeda gave up trying to gain a foothold amid feuding clans, erratic warlords and a wily population hardened by years of anarchy.

Now, in the wake of an aggressive U.S. counter-terrorism program that has alienated many Somalis, there are signs that Al Qaeda may have its best chance in years to win over Islamic hard-liners in the Horn of Africa nation.

. . .

U.S. Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger acknowledged growing links between Shabab and Al Qaeda, but said ties remained in the early stages.

"There are indications of a fairly close Shabab-Al Qaeda connection, though it's not clear to what extent they've been operationalized," he said. "Is Shabab taking orders from Al Qaeda? I would say no. They are still running their own show."

. . .

"Once we end the holy war in Somalia, we will take it to any government that participated in the fighting against Somalia or gave assistance to those attacking us," he said.

Analysts say such talk highlights a growing radicalization of Somalia's Islamists. Although Somalia has long had hard-liners, most of the population practiced a moderate form of Islam, and even extremists limited attacks to inside the country or against Ethiopia, a longtime rival.

But some worry a more radical agenda in Somalia has been aided by U.S. counter-terrorism efforts during the last two years, including half a dozen airstrikes against suspected terrorist targets that often killed civilians.

Somalia's citizens are also outraged by the ongoing occupation of Mogadishu by Ethiopian troops, who came in 2006 to defeat a short-lived Islamic government that had taken power largely with help from Shabab fighters.

Funny how conventional wisdom had long held the exact opposite of what the Bush administration was saying. For those of you keeping score at home, the US backed and supported an Eithiopian invasion of Somalia to overthrow a government they said was closely linked to and supporting al Qaeda, but are now saying that the links are only just now beginning and are starting to grow in response to US actions.

Basically, the invasion and continued foreign occupation has caused the radicalization and movement towards al Qaeda that it was supposed to prevent. Something about that sounds awfully familiar.

Doing Some Health Care Math

By BJ

A couple of weeks ago, Fester posted a story about a 7-month old infant being denied health insurance. In the comments, I remarked how glad I was that my great-grandparents had the good sense to move north into Canada. The kind of situation described in Fester's post is practically incomprehensible to most Canadians, (and pretty much every other part of the developed world). On Sunday, my sister got me to watch Michael Moore's Sicko, (I intended to watch it eventually, honest!), and again I was struck by the fact that for the most part, Canadians have lost the ability to truly appreciate what a private, profit-driven health care system really means.

The problem with this is that there are those looking to use that ignorance to remake the Canadian health care industry to their own advantage. There is, after all, very good money to be made in the health care industry. People will pay a great deal not to die or live in pain.

An Offshore Drilling Example

By BJ

While it probably didn't make the news down south, the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador signed a major offshore oil deal yesterday.

The government of Newfoundland and Labrador is estimating the province will gain at least $20 billion in royalties and up to 3,500 jobs from the Hebron offshore oil project, after a final agreement was signed Wednesday in St. John's.

While the US presidential race in the last few days has been far more concerned over whether or not some guard scratched a cross in the dirt back in the late sixties, or which candidate would be more likely to start WWIII, it wasn't all that long ago that the McCain campaign's big idea was to open up new areas of the US continental shelf to offshore drilling exploration to help ease gas prices. Well, here you have a present-day example of a new offshore field being developed, so I thought it might be instructive to see how long it takes for the 700 million barrels of oil there to start influencing gas prices.

The field was actually discovered back in 1981. For the better part of two decades it sat there undeveloped for economic reasons, but thanks to rising oil prices, it grew attractive again a few years ago.

What followed was one of the bitterest disputes over control of an oil field in recent Canadian history. The demand by Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams for an ownership stake in the project, and a refusal to give Chevron and Exxon a half billion in tax breaks had them walking out of the negotiations in 2006 and calling Williams the North American Hugo Chavez. Newfoundland and Labrador has been the poorest Canadian province for close to 50 years, and the companies no doubt thought that the apparent loss of such a potential windfall would either force Williams to come to their terms or see his opposition take over. Neither happened, and oil just kept rising, and suddenly the oil executives are all smiles as they sign the agreement with Williams.

More to the point when it comes to McCain's claims of opening up new areas of the shelf for oil exploration to affect gas prices, the agreement signed yesterday, for an oil field discovered almost 30 years ago, won't start pumping oil until at least 2017. How much do you think that will help you out when you next hit the gas station?

Be careful who you wish to be allies with

By BJ

Kevin Sullivan has a post up today arguing basically that Georgia and Ukraine should be allowed under NATO’s security umbrella so that they can have greater confidence in their sovereignty. His argument seems to be based on the fact that the Baltic states and other former Warsaw Pact members who have been most vocal in their criticisms of Russia are still pushing for diplomatic solutions, while Ukraine is apparently acting in a more aggressive fashion by offering to join the missile defence system. His update to the column:

Just to add to my point here, check out Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's rhetoric in his respective WSJ and WaPo columns on the invasion. Rather than framing the conflict as a regional, niche problem for Georgia to deal with, he inflates it (rightly or wrongly) into a test of Western values. This rhetoric is perfectly consistent with the American hawk community.

I think it's safe to say that his rhetoric would be slightly different were Georgia a NATO member today.

Says who? How exactly do you think giving somebody an iron-clad security guarantee will make them less likely to be confrontational? If Ukraine’s offering of cooperation with the US missile defence system is a sign of the government there rushing into the arms of the American unilateralist community, what do you call Poland’s sudden signing on to that very same system?

A few days ago, the guys at Fistful of Euros wrote the following:

The Russian-Georgian war should remind everyone of a very important point regarding NATO and the European Union. Specifically, just as John Lewis Gaddis said about the Cold War, reassurance was as important as deterrence, and this made self-deterrence very important indeed.

NATO members benefited from a common deterrent towards the Soviet Union, . . . the balance of power was so stable because as well as the prospect of a formidable conventional defence and a devastating nuclear counteroffensive, NATO also offered the Soviet Union confidence that nobody would do anything stupid. Reassurance was as important as deterrence, and its most important form was self-deterrence.

Self-deterrence? Yes. It was a provocative way of saying it, but what was meant was that everyone agreed to observe a policy of non-provocation towards the other side. The results of actually triggering the common deterrent were, after all, so awful that nobody would take the risk. The upshot, in Europe, was that the European club’s entry requirement is as follows: you must hand in your historical baggage to be searched. If they find any irredenta in there, you’ll have to get rid of them before you’re coming in.

Look at that in the light of Saakashvili’s decision to take South Ossetia by force. What would have happened had Georgia been a part of NATO and the assurances of Western support Saakashvili thought he had been legally binding? Sullivan seems to believe that being in NATO would soften the Ukrainian and Georgian leaderships’ stances versus Russia, but how sure can you be that it wouldn’t just harden them?

In the days after the conflict began, a senior envoy from a European state opposed to Georgian NATO entry told Reuters: “Thank heavens we didn’t take them in… No one in NATO wants to be dragged into a war in the Caucasus because of (President Mikheil) Saakashvili’s miscalculations.”

They say chains are as strong as their weakest link. In the same vein, alliances are as safe as their most reckless member. I, for one, would be very cautious about the possibility of handing NATO’s future over to another Gavrilo Princip.

French Troops Ambushed in Afghanistan

By BJ

While the news of the last week and a half has allowed all of the old Cold Warriors a chance to re-live their glory days, this morning comes with a major reminder that the hot wars Bush started under the "War on Terror" theme are still ongoing, and in the case of Afghanistan, gathering steam.

Ten French soldiers have been killed in an ambush by Taleban fighters east of the Afghan capital, Kabul, the French president's office has confirmed.

A further 21 French soldiers were wounded in the attack - the heaviest loss of troops France has suffered since deploying to Afghanistan in 2002.

. . .

The ambush came amid signs of deteriorating security in Afghanistan.

Taleban fighters have become more active near Kabul

Despite increased security in Kabul, two rockets were fired on the city overnight, landing close to the Isaf headquarters.

In the southern province of Kandahar a Nato patrol was struck by a roadside bomb.

And in the south-eastern province of Khost six suicide bombers were killed while attacking a Nato military base, Camp Salerno, Nato says.

This comes a month after militants stormed a US outpost near the Pakistan border, also with relatively heavy causalities on the coalition side. And this post by Pat Lang describes a "disaster waiting to happen" on another under-resourced outpost in the border area.

Maybe its all just a karmic reminder of the results of the last time we decided to arm and train a guerilla force to kill Russians.

What's up in the Ukraine?

By BJ

While a lot of the world's focus has been on Georgia this last week, for obvious reasons, the Ukraine is seen by many as another potential crisis-in-the-making between the West and Russia. And it looks as though the pro-Western Ukrainian President is already using the threat of the Russian bear to attack his most likely challengers.

Aides to Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko have accused Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of working in Russia's interests in a bid to become president.

. . .

"Last week, we announced that we had information about Yulia Tymoshenko's systematic work in the interests of Russia. Unfortunately, that information is now confirmed," said Mr Kyslynsky, quoted by the Interfax-Ukraine news agency.

"We will hand over the material we have to the law enforcement bodies, for detailed study," he said.

"Society has the right to get an answer to the question: How far can politicians go beyond the point where political campaigning ends and betrayal of national interests begins?"

For those with short memories, Tymoshenko was one of Yushchenko's biggest allies when he came to power during the "Orange Revolution", overturning the election of Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, Yanukovych and his Russian backers were accused of poisoning Yushchenko, something Yushchenko promised to launch a full investigation into once he came into power. Somehow, I've never heard anything more about it. Once Yushchenko became President, the story basically disappeared and the investigation, near as I can tell, either never happened or never found anything. If anybody knows different, I'd be curious to know.

In any case, Yanukovych, rather than fading away like a good defeated rival, came back to win the parliamentary elections and become Prime Minister. This sparked a power struggle between the two, which led to Yushchenko dissolving parliament and ordering troops into the streets of Kiev.

Still-an-ally Tymoshenko became Prime Minister after another narrow loss for the pro-Russian Yanukovych, but it appears that eyeing Yushchenko's Presidency is enough to flip someone from being "pro-democracy" to a "Russian traitor". It is a situation that bears watching, particularly given the apparent rush to bring both Ukraine and Georgia into NATO before they've really dealt with their internal issues arising from what were once meaningless borders that the Soviet leaders drew on a map nearly a century ago.

An Incomplete Analysis

By BJ

The New York Times has a military analysis of the Russian assault on Georgia. About the only new thing I learned is that the Georgians apparently did try to contest the Roki Tunnel.

The Russians also suffered losses as they came through the Roki Tunnel, which connects South Ossetia to the neighboring region of North Ossetia in Russia proper. Russian national security analysts said there was no air cover to protect Moscow’s forces in their first minutes outside the safety of the mountain tunnel.

The Georgians failure to block the tunnel has been the most nagging question of their initial assault, and this still information still doesn't answer why they didn't make it a higher priority. However, it isn't the part of the analysis that caught my attention.

Georgia’s overmatched army of about 30,000 was able to field four combat brigades of about 3,300 soldiers each.

At the start of the fighting, the Georgian Army’s First Brigade was in Iraq, and was airlifted home aboard American aircraft — but without their war-fighting gear. The Fourth Brigade was in training for the next rotation to Iraq. The Second and Third Brigades were in western Georgia, closer to Abkhazia than to South Ossetia, where the fighting started.

So Georgia only has four combat brigades and all of those are accounted for above, which leaves a quite glaringly obvious hole in this little analysis of Russian performance. I mean, the Georgians couldn't have inflicted losses on the Russians coming out of the Roki Tunnel or ambush their columns' advance if their troops weren't already in the breakaway region waiting for them. So if those four brigades are all the combat forces Georgia has and they were where the author claims they were, just who the hell did they send into South Ossetia in their initial assault?

If I didn't know better, I'd have to say that the "newspaper of record" was trying to gloss over that little fact.

Behind the Climate Change Deniers

By BJ

It should surprise approximately no one that behind those looking to cast doubt and deny the human impact on the world's climate, is a very familiar name using tried and tested tactics, though that may be about to change.

When the tobacco industry was feeling the heat from scientists who showed that smoking caused cancer, it took decisive action.

It engaged in a decades-long public relations campaign to undermine the medical research and discredit the scientists. The aim was not to prove tobacco harmless but to cast doubt on the science.

In May this year, the multibillion-dollar oil giant Exxon-Mobil acknowledged that it had been doing something similar. It announced that it would cease funding nine groups that had fuelled a global campaign to deny climate change.

Exxon's decision comes after a shareholder revolt by members of the Rockefeller family and big superannuation funds to get the oil giant to take climate change more seriously. Exxon (once Standard Oil) was founded by the legendary John D. Rockefeller. Last year, the chairman of the US House of Representatives oversight committee on science and technology, Brad Miller, said Exxon's support for sceptics "appears to be an effort to distort public discussion".

No word yet whether these groups will be included in the funding cuts.

Scientists and economists have been offered $10,000 each by a lobby group funded by one of the world's largest oil companies to undermine a major climate change report due to be published today.

Letters sent by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), an ExxonMobil-funded thinktank with close links to the Bush administration, offered the payments for articles that emphasise the shortcomings of a report from the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Travel expenses and additional payments were also offered.

. . .

On Monday, another Exxon-funded organisation based in Canada will launch a review in London which casts doubt on the IPCC report. Among its authors are Tad Murty, a former scientist who believes human activity makes no contribution to global warming. Confirmed VIPs attending include Nigel Lawson and David Bellamy, who believes there is no link between burning fossil fuels and global warming.

The tactics both the tobacco and oil industries used is remarkably similar to the "Intelligent Design" crowd's. Do everything you can to attack the real science and credibility of the scientists in an attempt to have your preferred mythology be the one people hear and believe. This way, they don't have to disprove the science, since they are already aware they can't, they just have to keep the belief alive that there is some kind of controversy about it, pretend that we don't really know if our addiction to burning fossil fuels is responsible for Climate Change.

Of course, there are still too many people who want to accept that particular lie. After all, who wants to acknowledge that they may be in part responsible for a global catastrophe? Odds are despite this slightly encouraging sign from Exxon, attitudes will change very little, and we'll continue on down our self-destructive path.

Russian Overreach

By BJ

I have noted before that the Russians seemed to have learned from the mistakes Israel made in its campaign against Hezbollah. It appears they've also learned from the Israelis how to dawdle about pulling your forces back after agreeing to a cease-fire. The major difference being that when the Israelis attempted a raid deep into Lebanese territory, Hezbollah made it clear they were willing and able to fight back. Georgia's military, on the other hand, has remained in its, "Please don't hurt me!" stance, which the Russians are taking rather excessive advantage of. More on that in a bit, but first compare the position of the Israeli government in 2006:

Israel has said it will continue to carry out such actions until an expanded international military force is in place to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament.

With the Russian government's position today:

Moscow also says it will only withdraw from Georgian territory once extra security measures are in place.

Similar on the surface, but as I said above, thanks in part to the lack of resistance by the Georgians, the Russians are going far beyond what the Israelis attempted after actually agreeing to a cease-fire. The Russians are continuing to advance well past the conflict zones and destroying any and all military hardware they can get their hands on.

While I don't believe they are planning an occupation or "regime change", what they are doing is just as bad in the long term. Had they remained at the cease-fire line or made limited incursions to Gori and/or Senaki to destroy the military hardware and then withdrew and kept the peace, the Georgian people could have got back on with their lives and start thinking about the idiot who got them into this mess. And while the West would have blustered and complained just as loudly, there would have been far less for them to really complain about.

Instead, the Russians have apparently decided to confirm nearly every stereotypical smear directed at them by the Georgians and have apparently lost the prudence that informed their combat response. They are rubbing salt into the Georgians' wounds, and while I still see little hope for Saakashvili's political future short of an authoritarian crack-down, the Russians are now making sure that there will be no legitimate Georgian leader who can view them with anything but distrust and hatred.

In other words, they have won the war, but are now working hard to lose the peace.

Securing the Arctic

By BJ

The greatly diminished extent of the Arctic sea ice means that a lot more ships are beginning to sail into what at one time was considered impassable waters, which is beginning to create some security concerns.

It's not that easy for hundreds of outsiders to suddenly sneak up on Barrow, considering how the northernmost town in the United States has neither a port nor a road to help them get here. Newcomers pretty much have to arrive on a big noisy plane.

Which is why nearly everyone in this historic Inupiat community was surprised last fall when they woke up to find about 400 German tourists walking around town. How the heck did they get here?

The answer?

They sailed from Europe to Barrow the short way -- via the suddenly ice-free Canadian Arctic -- after the fabled Northwest Passage opened completely last summer for the first time in recorded history.

"Yes, that was a surprise," North Slope Borough Mayor Edward Itta said Thursday, standing on the Barrow airport tarmac.

But not just for the townspeople. Commanders with the U.S. Coast Guard stationed far to the south in Juneau and Kodiak were surprised as well.

"They said, 'What Germans? What cruise ships?' " Itta recalled with a laugh. "And I said, 'They're here.' "

Now, it is interesting to discover that America's Arctic defences are more or less the same as what Canada has. "Like, uh, we'd appreciate it if you'd let us know if you're gonna be in the area, eh." However, it is becoming apparent that such measures are probably insufficient for an Arctic Ocean that is becoming increasingly navigable and popular as a cruise destination, and as such, Arctic nations are beginning to respond.

A Danish admiral is adding his voice to Canadian calls for better safety regulation of Arctic shipping as recreational sailing and tourist cruises in northern waters reach record levels.

Rear Admiral Henrik Kudsk of Denmark's Greenland Command told an international conference in Alaska this week there should be mandatory requirements for equipment and preparation before vessels are entitled to sail into the Arctic.

. . .

In Greenland, Kudsk said he's expecting 45 cruise ships carrying 55,000 passengers — a 60 per cent increase from last year.

No nation has enough search and rescue capability to deal with a disaster on ships of that size, Kudsk said. The best solution is to have those ships sail near enough to help each other out.

. . .

"The danger of any kind of ship accident in the Arctic is we won't be able to clean up the mess," said Dennis Bevington, the New Democrat MP for the Western Arctic who attended the conference in Fairbanks.

Ensuring ships in the North are properly equipped and able to withstand ice would protect both lives and the fragile Arctic environment, he said.

Of course, the Canadian government at least, is far longer on rhetoric than results when it comes to Arctic issues, and it may just take a cruise ship disaster of Titanic proportions to point out to everyone just how scarce, isolated, and under-resourced the Arctic coastline truly is. The only sure thing at the moment is that sea traffic is increasing rapidly, and so we'd better figure out a way to deal with it.

Friday Night Musings on Georgia

By BJ

The post-mortems of the conflict are beginning to fly fast and furious. For me right now, just a few random musings.

First, I can't believe that I find myself in basic agreement with Peter Worthington. Given just how closely aligned the man is to the Bush-neocon cabal, his column is a remarkably straight forward and clear-eyed view of the conflict, plus he adds the US invasions of Grenada and Panama to the list of conflicts the Russian assault can be compared to.

By an amazing coincidence, Poland and the US ink a missile defence deal the day after hostilities in Georgia end. Anyone who still doesn't believe that said shield is aimed at the Russians has the intelligence of a cabbage roll. The Poles certainly know what they're doing:

"Above all, it seems that the Americans changed their opinion as a result of the situation in the Caucasus," Bogdan Klich told the Polish newspaper, Dziennik.

"In Washington's eyes, this conflict proved that Russia was not a stable partner for the States."

How long do you think before we hear of Iran buying fancy new anti-aircraft missiles?

Baracky II

By BJ

Via The Jed Report. Not sure who to credit with this little masterpiece, but the very fact that they managed to graft the 2008 election onto one of my favourite boxing movies makes it something I just have to share.

Gonna fly now.

War in Georgia Wrap-Up

By BJ

Granted that things aren't entirely over or resolved yet, but for the most part the cease-fire appears to be holding. A bit of sanity has returned compared to yesterday's coverage with claims that the Russians were marching on Tbilisi. Instead, it appears that they're just securing and probably destroying ammunition and other military equipment near the Georgian staging areas, as well as actually trying to restore order in the areas Georgia abandoned.

Gori, which lies some 15km (10 miles) from the South Ossetian border and is a key link to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, had been reported calm earlier on Thursday.

The BBC's Gabriel Gatehouse, in the town, said local residents reported feeling safe and secure on Wednesday night, with Russian troops clearly in charge of the town.

. . .

Russian troops were allowing armed Georgian police back into the town, and would not leave until order is restored, Gen Vyacheslav Borisov said.

Given all of the trouble unguarded ammunition dumps caused for the US in Iraq, the Russians actions seem prudent, particularly given the reports of "volunteers" from other parts of the Caucasus streaming into the area to "help" the South Ossetians. (There were reports of looting in Tskhinvali as well.) Also recall that this isn't terribly far from Chechyna and that the Beslan massacre was in North Ossetia.

In any case, it's quiet enough that I think we can begin to offer some thoughts on what happened.

Who's Responsible for This Mess?

The simple answer to the above is that Georgian President Saakashvili started the war by invading South Ossetia and is to blame for the Russian response, but wars are never simple and the simple answers tend to hide the culpability of the many other parties involved.

On Saturday I linked to a piece by Daniel Nexon who laid out three main scenarios for how the war got started:

1. The South Ossetian's provoked the conflict to draw in Russia, both Georgia and Russia took the bait;

2. The Russians orchestrated a series of provocations, Georgia took the bait;

3. Georgia decided to seize the moment to "liberate" South Ossetia and assumed that some combination of (a) western support, (b) international distraction, and (c) being able to point to South Ossetian attacks as a justification for the offensive would resolve things in their favor.

To start with the first scenario, it seems safe to say that whatever assurances the Georgians had or misinterpreted from the West, the South Ossetians had far more explicit assurances from Russia. As such, the claim that they felt they could get away with whatever provocations they choose isn’t without merit. However, given just how completely dependant and integrated the South Ossetian authorities are with the Russian government, the idea that they orchestrated the entire affair by themselves seems highly unlikely. Despite that, the feeling the Russians had their backs probably made the Ossetians far more provocative and belligerent than they would have been otherwise, so they still come in for at least a share of the fault for the underlying situation.

That brings us to scenario two. While the US foreign policy elite’s wish to help gloss over Saakashvili’s role entirely and paint Russia as a monstrous aggressor in the mold of Hilter is ridiculous hyperbole, it is fairly obvious that they weren’t uninterested, innocent bystanders. Russia had made a whole series of provocative and sometimes aggressive moves against Georgia over the last few years, and I can certainly sympathize with the not-entirely-unfounded paranoia of a small nation tucked up against a far more powerful neighbour who likes to view you as their backyard in influence terms.

Also arguing in favour for this scenario is something I commented on another blog, that large military forces don’t mobilize and move in force all that quickly. Russia had significant numbers of armour units pouring through the Roki tunnel approximately 12 hours after the initial Georgian assault. The Russians certainly weren’t caught flat-footed and indeed seem to have been prepared for the Georgian moves.

Arguing against this scenario is the Roki tunnel itself. The only major road connecting South Ossetia to Russia runs through that tunnel, and as the War Nerd, (among others), pointed out, that’s a pretty damned easy link to sever. Even if you didn’t want to destroy the tunnel, rushing up a few pieces of artillery to the exit would make it suicidal for an armour column to file out of the tunnel from Russia.

Why the Georgians didn’t play it smart and move to block the tunnel is the question that’s likely to befuddle military historians looking back at this conflict, but it also makes the idea of the Russians provoking Georgia into an attack look less likely as well. Because if the Georgians had played it smart and blocked the tunnel, the only way for that Russian armour to get into South Ossetia would have been for them to fly or to drive the long way around through Georgian territory to the same highway up from Gori the Georgians took.

Now, were the Russians planning to conquer all of Georgia anyway this probably wouldn’t have been an issue, but as we’ve seen, Russian goals have remained limited to the two enclaves, so had the Georgians been smart and cut off the Roki tunnel, they would likely now be in victorious possession of South Ossetia and the Russians would have been humiliated. Would you provoke a fight where the most likely scenario has you being humiliated?

And as for the question of how the Russians seemed well-prepared to head off the Georgian advance, the same dictum that armies don’t mobilize or move quickly applies equally well to the Georgian military. Their massing of forces for the advance didn’t happen spontaneously. They prepared this in advance, and it is not unlikely that the Russian’s intelligence resources in the former Soviet republic were sufficient to catch wind of it and see to the readiness of a response. (That the US intelligence services apparently missed the mobilization of both forces doesn’t say too much about its abilities.)

All that said, the Russians obviously weren't displeased with the opportunity to bash some Georgian heads, and there remains the possibility that they did trick Saakashvili into doing something stupid. Of course, that still leave Saakashvili as a gullible idiot who got tricked into doing something incredibly stupid.

That leaves us with scenario number three. Saakashvili had made the return of the breakaway regions a major plank in his government’s platform. As noted above, there was certainly good reason to believe that the conquest of South Ossetia could be accomplished with little in the way of muss and fuss. It is also clear that during America’s recent beefing up of Georgia’s military forces that said forces looked to use their new training and equipment to retake the breakaway regions.

And while a lot of the US press coverage has noted many of the Russian provocations in the years and months leading up to the fighting, it is important to note that the provocations weren’t exactly one-sided. While Russia sent fighters over Georgia, Georgia was and apparently still is sending drone aircraft over the breakaway regions. It had until recently controlled small enclaves in both regions with its own irregular proxy forces to serve as provokers.

It also seems reasonable that Saakashvili was counting on his western backing to slow or stop any Russian military response. After all, the west and its allies have been having things pretty much their own way the last decade and a half, marching NATO east over Russian objections, looking to set up missile defence bases over Russian objections, funding “democratic” colour-coded revolutions like the one that brought Saakashvili to power over Russian objections, recognizing Kosovo’s independence over Russia’s objections, and agreeing in principle to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s eventual admission to NATO over Russia’s objections.

Reading the above, even I’m a little surprised that the Russians were ready and willing to take decisive military action. Saakashvili no doubt thought he could go in and take tiny South Ossetia over too quickly for the Russians to mount a major defence, have the West recognize his claim, and watch Moscow rumble and stew but ultimately back down as it has in the past.

Finally, as noted above, armies don’t move spontaneously. Saakashvili’s claims that attacks by the Ossetians in the few hours between when he called for a cease-fire and the Georgian assault began were what made him decide to order that "defensive action" simply doesn’t fly. This was a pre-planned assault that had Tskhinvali encircled, the Ossetian defences overwhelmed, and the high ground around the city taken over for artillery barrages in a very short time by several units moving in unison. From what I can tell from the calls by the Georgian military for the civilian population of the city to start north, they may have been hoping to drive most of the separatist population out of the country, (which explains, if in a particularly unsympathetic way, their unusual decision not to block the Roki tunnel).

So ultimately it is still fair to say that Saakashvili started the current fiasco, and he still gets a goodly portion of the blame for what followed, but the other parties will be getting their share apportioned as more information comes out.

Who Wins and Who Loses?

On the ground, Russia wins big. While the Georgians looked to put up a fight for the first couple of days, the Russian firepower and airpower was too much for the Georgians to hold up against. In the end, the Georgians not only retreated, but abandoned the field in near panic.

Last October, I posted a sort of advice column for the Turks should they decide to launch a punitive attack against the PKK rebels in Northern Iraq, using the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon War as an example of mistakes to avoid. The main points were to avoid setting maximalist goals, not to underestimate their opponent, avoid causing large-scale civilian casualties and suffering, and above all, be quick about it.

The Russians seem to have followed all of those points. They set out with a very specific and narrowly-defined goal; drive the Georgian military out of the breakaway regions, brought more than enough force to bear to ensure they could do so, mainly limited their attacks to the conflict zones and military targets, leaving the civilian infrastructure mostly intact, and agreed to a cease-fire by day five.

How much the victory on the ground will translate into success on the geopolitical stage is another matter that won't become clear for some time yet, but from what I can tell, Russian morale is certainly a lot higher than it used to be.

After the Russians, the separatists in Abhkazia come in as big winners, having taken the opportunity to drive out the last Georgian military presence in their region without too much difficulty, and pretty much assured the Georgians won't be looking to use force against them anytime soon.

The same goes for the South Ossetians, with the caveat that their capital is in ruins and significant chunks of their population is either dead or displaced.

The Russians have made it clear that they want the two regions to be able to hold referendums on their future fate. They've done so before, but the international community has ignored them. It is unlikely they'll be able to do so this time if they are a part of the peace agreement the EU negotiates, and the Russians are probably rightfully confident that neither region is about to vote to rejoin the country that was so recently bombing them.

Topping the list on the losing side is Georgia. Saakashvili's gamble has resulted in their military being humiliated, their forces driven out of the breakaway regions, and their claims to said regions pretty much a lost cause from here on out.

How much Saakashvili will pay personally for his blunder is as yet hard to say. The people of Georgia followed the old pattern of "rally 'round the flag" while the bombs were dropping, but once the war starts to recede, so does the rationale for rallying around the guy who started it. At a guess, his remaining in power "democratically" seems rather unlikely.

Also losing out is anyone who was hoping to break Russia's stranglehold on oil and gas pipelines from central Asia. As the BBC notes, while there is significant pressure to protect current investments, raising capital to build or expand capacity is likely to meet with reluctance.

This means Europe loses as its options for breaking away from their dependance on Russian-controlled pipelines are again constrained.

NATO, and particularly the US, suffer a considerable blow to their reputation thanks to their leaving a supposed ally out to dry. It did in large part show the limits of Western power these days. At least some of the nations in Europe are aware of their limitations, and blocked America's push to have Georgia added to their roles post haste in April. Whether or not they decide to respond to this blow to their reputation by extending their membership now is another matter. It has certainly already gotten the Poles to push for a lot more concrete security guarantees before they agree to host the US missile defence shield.

The US situation in particular reminds me of Sun Tzu:

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When your weapons are dulled, your ardour dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

Finally, the US media proved once again that when there is a war to cover, they make really good cheerleaders.

Putin or Medvedev?

Actually less clear then I would have thought a couple of days ago. While Putin appeared to be running the show from the front while the fighting was going on, he's all but disappeared now that peace talks are underway. It seems to me that the two men are clearly working the situation together to their best advantages.

Putin is already considered by most in the West to be an autocratic tyrant, so who better to put up in front of the cameras while Russian armour is smashing through its small neighbours' military? Now that things have hit the negotiating table, Medvedev, who the West hasn't had time to form such a negative image about, appears as the guy running the show.

Say what you will, the Russians aren't stupid.

The Butcher's Bill

Still unknown at this point. The best numbers I've seen reported from Reuters has the Russians claiming 74 soldiers killed and 171 wounded and 19 missing. The Georgians claim 175 dead and hundreds more wounded, but its unclear if that includes Georgian civilian deaths. In any case, I would expect that number to rise. The casualties from South Ossetia, civilian or otherwise, are still unclear. The claim of over 1,600 killed seems unlikely to stand, but the toll will probably still be considerable. And there doesn't seem to be anything coming out of Abhkazia for the moment.

Real Differences in Candidate's Energy Plans

By BJ

Last week, McClatchy noted that while the two Presidential candidate's sound quite similar in their energy proposals, there are actually quite significant differences between the two.

Voters have a clear choice on energy issues in this fall's presidential election.

However, it's not the choice that this week's torrent of rhetoric from presumptive presidential nominees John McCain or Barack Obama suggests.

Both have been touting positions that sound vaguely alike. Each has said he'd accept some offshore oil drilling, urge more nuclear power and accelerate alternative energy development.

The article then goes on to layout the different approaches the two candidates are actually proposing. Obama is far more focused on developing alternative energy sources and increasing energy efficiency, while McCain is, unsurprisingly, vague on such things while pumping up the "snake oil" of offshore drilling and proposing major increase in nuclear power. The article ends:

Some experts wonder if voters are getting any of this.

"The debate has been almost ethereal," said Kearney. "It's all so tangled."

Well, Thomas Freidman today has decided to take McCain to task over this issue.

John McCain recently tried to underscore his seriousness about pushing through a new energy policy, with a strong focus on more drilling for oil, by telling a motorcycle convention that Congress needed to come back from vacation immediately and do something about America’s energy crisis. “Tell them to come back and get to work!” McCain bellowed.

Sorry, but I can’t let that one go by. McCain knows why.

It was only five days earlier, on July 30, that the Senate was voting for the eighth time in the past year on a broad, vitally important bill — S. 3335 — that would have extended the investment tax credits for installing solar energy and the production tax credits for building wind turbines and other energy-efficiency systems.

Both the wind and solar industries depend on these credits — which expire in December — to scale their businesses and become competitive with coal, oil and natural gas. Unlike offshore drilling, these credits could have an immediate impact on America’s energy profile.

Senator McCain did not show up for the crucial vote on July 30, and the renewable energy bill was defeated for the eighth time. In fact, John McCain has a perfect record on this renewable energy legislation. He has missed all eight votes over the last year — which effectively counts as a no vote each time. Once, he was even in the Senate and wouldn’t leave his office to vote.

“McCain did not show up on any votes,” said Scott Sklar, president of The Stella Group, which tracks clean-technology legislation. Despite that, McCain’s campaign commercial running during the Olympics shows a bunch of spinning wind turbines — the very wind turbines that he would not cast a vote to subsidize, even though he supports big subsidies for nuclear power.

TPM carried much the same story yesterday, and as our colleague Ron noted, this puts McCain in a tough position as his own rhetoric has pushed him into a corner thanks to the, "Gang of 10" energy proposal. As Friedman puts it:

That is what this election should be focusing on. Everything else is just bogus rhetoric designed by cynical candidates who think Americans are so stupid — so bloody stupid — that if you just show them wind turbines in your Olympics ad they’ll actually think you showed up and voted for such renewable power — when you didn’t.

Well, this is a country that swallowed the "Clear Skies" and "Healthy Forests" initiatives, so I remain skeptical that we'll hear any more about McCain's energy hypocrisy, but at least some people are noticing.

Not Quite Over Yet

By BJ

This morning brings conflicting reports that the Russian military is in the Georgian city of Gori, though there doesn't appear to have been any fighting overnight.

Georgia's president accused Russia of sending 50 tanks into the central Georgian city of Gori on Wednesday despite an agreed-upon ceasefire calling on both sides to retreat to positions they held before fighting began six days ago.

"As I speak, the Russian tanks are attacking the town of Gori and are rampaging through the town," Saakashvili told reporters during a press conference in the Georgian capital Tbilisi. "There is marauding. There is destruction of buildings."

Reuters, with a corespondent in the area, has a somewhat different take:

Meanwhile, Georgia accused Russia of sending dozens of tanks on Wednesday into the Georgian town of Gori, 25 km (15 miles) south of Tskhinvali.

Moscow strongly denied the claim and a witness in the town, the birthplace of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, told Reuters no Russian military could be seen. "I've been all over town. No tanks. No Russians," he said.

Witnesses said Russian forces had in fact set up two checkpoints on the outskirts of Gori and had occupied an abandoned Georgian artillery base 4-5 km (2-3 miles) from Gori town centre.

The reports of looting I find much more credible given the Georgian authorities completely abandoned the area, resulting in a power vacuum, and looting and anarchy are pretty much standard fare in such cases.

And on the Abhkazia front:

The self-styled president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, said on Wednesday that the region's forces had pushed out Georgian troops and captured the disputed upper reaches of the Kodori Gorge on the region's boundary with Georgia proper.

That was a major blow to Tbilisi, since the gorge was the only significant portion of Abkhaz territory under its control.

Blow to Tbilisi or not, this actually bodes somewhat better for the cease-fire holding, since the continued dispute over that area could easily have re-ignited the fighting elsewhere.

In any case, tensions remain quite high, and Saakashvili certainly hasn't tempered his rhetoric. If anything, it seems to have gotten worse the moment the Russian guns stopped firing, but it doesn't look like either government really wants to start things up again. Whether some of their subordinates or proxies do is another matter, but the longer the cease-fire holds, the less likely it is that it will be broken.

Wait and see.

"Security Contractors" in Afghanistan

By BJ

The Stars and Stripes has a video up of Canadian and US soldiers confronting Afghan security contractors over the shooting of a Canadian soldier on the weekend.

The shooting death of a Canadian soldier this weekend provides a grim example of how chaotic the security situation can often be in southern Afghanistan.

The soldier was mortally wounded Saturday morning in Kandahar province when Afghan private security guards opened fire indiscriminately after Taliban insurgents attacked a nearby group of Canadian troops, according to coalition military officers.

. . .

As with the situation in Iraq in recent years, the proliferation of private security guards illustrates just how few coalition troops and Afghan security forces are available to meet all of the myriad security demands in the country.

. . .

"Their normal contact drill is that as soon as they get hit with something, then it’s 360, open up on anything that moves," Frederickson said. "We think that’s probably what happened."

After the shooting occurred, the private security convoy continued west on Route 1 from Spin Beer district until they were stopped by Afghan security forces and their Canadian and U.S. military advisers in Maiwand district, about 20 miles away.

When questioned by Canadian and U.S. military officers, several of the Afghan security guards freely admitted to opening fire on what they thought were Taliban fighters. But when informed that a Canadian soldier had been wounded, their stories began to change, and many never claimed to have fired at all. Some of the security guards blamed the Afghan army for the incident.

The video can be found at the link. The part that really throws me is where a US soldier describes frequent encounters with contractor convoys, "driving by with guns sticking out of the windows", "usually with uniforms", and they just wave and pass by.

From the CBC story on the incident, few of the contractors bother to tell the coalition of their activities, and its a pretty safe bet the coalition doesn't communicate too well with the contractors either. It makes the likelihood of friendly fire incidents quite high, but the real danger that leaps out at me is if the insurgents clue in to using this kind of nonchalance to get close to coalition forces and doing some serious damage, both directly and indirectly by sparking a lot more "friendly" fire incidents from the coalition side.

Also from CBC, the number of "private soldiers" in Afghanistan is put at 28,000, which is nearly a match for the number of NATO troops in country. Even if it is only a small number of these unaccountable contractors who, "open up on everything that moves" in a 360 degree arc, its a pretty safe bet they're not helping in the whole "hearts and minds" area. Not that that is a big surprise.

Bush Looks to Neuter the Endangered Species Act

By BJ

Well, it isn’t just overseas that people are using the distraction of the Olympics to create some new facts on the ground. In this case making some moves in the War on Science:

The Bush administration yesterday proposed a regulatory overhaul of the Endangered Species Act to allow federal agencies to decide whether protected species would be imperiled by agency projects, eliminating the independent scientific reviews that have been required for more than three decades.

The new rules, which will be subject to a 30-day per comment period, would use administrative powers to make broad changes in the law that Congress has resisted for years. Under current law, agencies must subject any plans that potentially affect endangered animals and plants to an independent review by the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service. Under the proposed new rules, dam and highway construction and other federal projects could proceed without delay if the agency in charge decides they would not harm vulnerable species.

In a telephone call with reporters yesterday, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne described the new rules as a "narrow regulatory change" that "will provide clarity and certainty to the consultation process under the Endangered Species Act."

But environmentalists and congressional Democrats blasted the proposal as a last-minute attempt by the administration to bring about dramatic changes in the law. For more than a decade, congressional Republicans have been trying unsuccessfully to rewrite the act, which property owners and developers say imposes unreasonable economic costs.

You know how all those Republicans always bitch about those “activist judges legislating from the bench” to overturn the unconstitutional laws they occasionally manage to cram through Congress or some state legislature? That when our elected representatives pass a law it needs to be respected and followed? Want to bet you won’t hear any of them complaining about this bypassing of the legislative branch?

"Clearly, [this is] a case of asking the fox to guard the chicken coop," Irvin said, adding that the original law created "a giant caution light that made federal agencies stop and think about the impacts of their actions." He said, "What the Bush administration is telling those agencies is they don't have to think about those impacts anymore."

And what assault on the Endangered Species Act would be complete without an attempt to limit its potential impact on Climate Change?

The new rules would also limit the impact of the administration's decision in May to list the polar bear as threatened with extinction because of shrinking sea ice.

At the time of that decision, Kempthorne said he would seek changes to the Endangered Species Act on the grounds that it was inflexible, adding that it had not been significantly modified since 1986. In a statement yesterday, the Interior Department declared that even if a federal action such as the permitting of a power plant would lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions, the decision would not trigger a federal review "because it is not possible to link the emissions to impacts on specific listed species such as polar bears."

Kempthorne said the new regulations included that language "so we don't inadvertently have the Endangered Species Act seen as a back door to climate-change policy that was never, ever intended."

Well, certainly never, ever intended by the Bush administration, who never, ever intended to have a climate change policy. In any case, this appears to be another in a growing list of policy changes that the Bush administration is trying to impose before it leaves office in an attempt to carry on its legacy past their losing power, or at least make it difficult and time-consuming for the next administration to reverse and repair the damage, (assuming McCain doesn’t win and just carries on making things worse).

"Major Combat Operations Have Ended"

By BJ

Well, Russia has apparently had enough fun beating down the Georgians for now and President Medvedev is ordering an end to military operations. Despite the increasingly hysterical claims of a full-fledged invasion and take-over of Georgia, it is unclear yet whether or not the Russian did any more than launch a single raid outside of the breakaway regions with ground troops, instead relying on air power to bomb the Georgian staging areas and other military targets.

Probably for the best given the Georgian army's panicked scattering from Gori on the mere rumour the Russians were coming show that they aren't exactly fit to defend much of anything right now.

While it is still unclear if the Russians ever set foot outside of South Ossetia, and the fighting there seems to have died down, the real prize of the two breakaway regions has always been Abhkazia, where fighting apparently continues in the Georgian-occupied Kodori Gorge. If that doesn't get resolved soon, the whole mess could flare up once again.

If, however, this does turn out to be the end of "major combat operations", you'd have to say that the Georgians got off pretty light for Saakashvili's stupidity. As Daniel Nexon notes:

• Saakashvili launched an offensive after claiming to want negotiations to stop the escalating crisis. He did so less than twenty-four hours after calling for cease-fire negotiations, in an operation that looks like it wasn't dreamed up overnight (but, given some of its tactical mistakes, it might as well have been).

• The Russians respond with overwhelming force but limit their ground operations (so far) to the break away republics and adjacent staging grounds for Georgian actual or potential military operations. They initiate a naval blockade and commence bombing runs inside of Georgia. The west accused them of "dangerous escalation."

• But if this were a United States operation you can bet that the US navy would be blockading the country and the USAF would be taking out every piece of military hardware or key transportation hub they could find. Indeed, the US would be actively aiming at regime change. The United States did all of these things in the Kosovo campaign.

And I'll leave the last word to the War Nerd, Gary Brecher:

There are three basic facts to keep in mind about the smokin’ little war in Ossetia:

1.    The Georgians started it.
2.    They lost.

3.    What a beautiful little war!

Granted number 3 isn't that important in geopolitical terms, but the guy has a persona to keep up, and he has what is probably the right take on what aftermath will be.

The fretting and fussing and sky-is-falling crap about this war is going to die down fast, and the bottom line will be simple: the Georgians overplayed their hand and got slapped, and we caught a little of the follow-through, which is what happens when you waste your best troops—and Georgia’s, for that matter—on a dumb war in the wrong place. We detatched Kosovo from a Russian ally; they detached South Ossetia from an American ally. It’s a pawn exchange, if that. If it signals anything bigger, it’s the fact that the US is weaker than it was ten years ago and Russia is much, much stronger than it was in Yeltsin’s time. But anybody with sense knew all that already.

Russia Invades Georgia Proper

By BJ

Confirmed reports now that the Russians have sent troops across the frontier between the breakaway region of Abhkazia and Georgia.

Whether or not this is just some ploy to try and force the Georgians to give up what are likely pretty well defended and dug in redoubts in the two breakaway regions that they've controlled for some time, or the start of something bigger, it is fair to say the war has entered a new phase. More then ever, the question of what the endgame will be is the big one in my mind, (or if there will be one - see Iraq invasion).

And regardless of the painfully hyperbolic rhetoric by the neocon trust, there still isn't sweet-bugger-all the West can do about the whole mess, though given still-President Bush is still enjoying his holiday in Beijing, there doesn't seem to be any intent to do anything, anyway.

So This is What a Pawn Feels Like?

By BJ

It was the question of the day. As Russian forces massed Sunday on two fronts, Georgians were heading south with whatever they could carry. When they met Western journalists, they all said the same thing: Where is the United States? When is NATO coming?

and

As a Russian jet bombed fields around his village, Djimali Avago, a Georgian farmer, asked me: “Why won’t America and Nato help us? If they won’t help us now, why did we help them in Iraq?”

A similar sense of betrayal coursed through the conversations of many Georgians here yesterday as their troops retreated under shellfire and the Russian Army pressed forward to take full control of South Ossetia.

Daniel Larison has a good post up on what he calls the exploitation of "New Europe" by the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq War, where they dangled the promise of NATO membership and other enticements to gain those countries support for Bush's military adventure. Now that it is Georgia that needs support, they are understandably looking askance at the near lack of such aid. As one those quoted in the stories above put it, "If you want to help, you have to help the end".

While a lot of the political focus in the US has understandably been turned to the candidates' reactions to try and discern what kind of foreign policy they'd run, they aren't the ones in charge. And just what is it that still-President Bush was doing over the weekend while Georgians were being bombed and run out of South Ossetia? Oh yeah . . . cavorting with the Women's Beach Volleyball team.

Not that I don't like me some Women's Beach Vollyball, but how do you think those pictures are playing in Tbilisi? Whatever else you can say about Bush, he does manage to find photogenic ways to show just how "compassionate" a conservative he really is, and just how little the US gives a crap about Georgia.

It probably explains why its acting-President Cheney who is making the brave statements about how Russian military aggression can't go unanswered. Not like we'll be answering with any actual military force or anything, but keep up the fight Georgians! See if you can suck the Russians into another Afghanistan. Sure it will suck for you to, but we'll be right their alongside you, in spirit, cheering from the sidelines.

Fester asked earlier just how credible American and NATO security guarantees are to the three Baltic states. You can be sure they're asking themselves the very same question about now.

So is there an Endgame?

By BJ

One of the biggest problems with most wars is that they generally don't offer any "capture the flag" moment where both sides can generally agree that the issue has been decided and the winner can walk away with the spoils and the loser can go off to mope and start planning for a revenge match. Too many people have been hopelessly deluded by the complete capitulations of Germany and Japan at the end of WWII, and seem to figure that wars have to continue until "Victory!" is achieved.

The Georgians are certainly not going to storm Moscow when they couldn't even finish off a small city a couple miles from their border, and though they are likely capable of it, the Russians don't appear inclined to storm Tbilisi anytime soon.

The Georgians appear to be trying to extract themselves from the foolish gamble Saakashvili took with South Ossetia, (foolish in the sense that it failed, had the Georgians managed to reach and block off the Roki tunnel, this would have been a completely different ballgame), but it appears that their forces have only withdrawn to the pre-Aug. 6 lines. Like the Kandori Gorge in Abhkazia, there are portions of the traditional boundaries of South Ossetia that were under Georgian control before this latest flare-up.

The Russians, for their part, seem to be demanding a status change for South Ossetia, though whether that means independence or annexation is anybody's guess, as well as a non-aggression pledge from Georgia, and possibly the removal of Saakashvili from power.

So the questions then become: Will the Georgians accept any of that? And if they don't, what can the Russians do about it?

So far the Russians have limited their attacks to the conflict zones, the Georgian staging areas just outside of them, and a few other strategic targets, though that list of "other" targets does seem to be growing. If the Georgians don't capitulate far enough, soon enough, the Russians seem to be prepared to begin a kind of "Effects Based Operation" on Georgia's infrastructure to bring them to heel.

That may work, but it may just cause the Georgians to rally. Prior to the current dust-up, the Georgian opposition was less than thrilled with Saakashvili's rule, but have been mostly silent or supportive now that the fighting has gotten underway, (much like every other nation, its pretty damned hard to criticize your government when bombs are falling around you without looking, and probably feeling, like a traitor).

How much further would the Russians be willing to go? Douglas Muir has just posted some speculation that the Russians are moving beyond South Ossetia.

Various sources are reporting that the Russians have rolled out of South Ossetia and into Georgia proper, and are mounting a major attack on the town of Gori. Gori is about 15-20 km south of the South Ossetian border, and about 70-80 km from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. Russian forces are also massing along Georgia’s border with Abkhazia, preparing to open a second front there.

. . .

[I]f Russia really is entering Georgia in force, it’s about to become a different sort of game altogether. Russia has no reason to do that unless it’s gunning for regime change. Attacking Gori is right at the bleeding edge of plausible self-defense; Gori is near the border, and has been the forward base for Georgian operations in South Ossetia. But going beyond Gori, landing forces on the Georgian coast, or attacking in force out of Abkhazia, would be something else again.

I'll note again Joshua Foust's cautionary post about taking reports too seriously until they can be verified by some independent sources on the ground. The NYT is carrying the report, but its only source for now appears to be the Georgian government, (h/t LGM), and even Muir doesn't seem entirely convinced of the reports.

It’s hard to believe. Their actions so far could be a prelude to invasion. But they’re also consistent with a more reasonable set of goals: driving the Georgians well back, damaging their ability to make war, and inflicting maximum humiliation on Saakashvili’s government. And if part of this has been about Putin demonstrating his primacy over all rivals, then a short victorious campaign — as opposed to a longer war for regime change — seems like the best outcome for him.

Which is basically in line with my own thoughts on the matter, but also brings me back to my main question; How do the Russians end their short, currently victorious campaign?

And the other question that inevitably comes up is what, besides a strongly-worded, sure to be vetoed, UNSC resolution, can the US or the rest of the international community do about it? There are of course, some who contemplate the US and Nato coming to Georgia's rescue.

So there is something NATO could do. It could threaten with military action or, better, intervention and it could start talking to Russia actively to convince the Russians to stop their aggression. If this does not suffice, NATO countries can punish Russia by other means, and they can start the procedure to send peacekeepers to the region. Turkey, an important NATO ally, is located close to Georgia; Turkey’s territory can be used by NATO to push the Russian forces back into Russia. Such a threat alone would be suffice to push the Russians back into their own territory.

It's hard to over-emphasize the sheer delusional lunacy of such a proposal. Turkey does share a border with Georgia, but it seems unlikely that they're chomping at the bit to re-start the Russo-Turkish wars, and just where the hell does Michael think NATO is going to come up with the forces needed to even pose a credible threat to Russian troops in the Caucasus, let alone capable of carrying through on a threat to "push the Russians back into their own territory"? What, once the US is finished flying Georgia's Iraq contingent home, they and the Brits should pack up and march north through Iraqi Kurdistan and set up in Turkey?

The Russians, apparently unlike MVDG, know how to do math, and are quite aware that the US and NATO have used up their readily-deployable forces dealing with the twin insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. That's likely what was behind Putin telling Saakashvili in April that he could shove Western assurances where the sun don't shine.

The lunacy of a NATO or US intervention also fails to acknowledge that both need Russia's assistance for a whole host of other reasons.

For the Bush administration, the choice now becomes whether backing Georgia — which, more than any other former Soviet republic has allied with the United States — on the South Ossetia issue is worth alienating Russia at a time when getting Russia’s help to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions is at the top of the United States’ foreign policy agenda.

One United Nations diplomat joked on Saturday that “if someone went to the Russians and said, ‘OK, Kosovo for Iran,’ we’d have a deal.”

That might be hyperbole, but there is a growing feeling among some officials in the Bush administration that perhaps the United States cannot have it all, and may have to choose its priorities, particularly when it comes to Russia.

Add to that Russia's almost complete control of the oil routes out of the Caspian producing regions, the assistance and logistical support for the Afghan mission, and the diplomatic efforts in regards to North Korea's nuclear program, and pobably a great deal more that the West needs Russian support on to be successful. As Daniel Larison states:

It’s an encouraging sign that this feeling is growing at least among some officials, but what does it say about this administration that they apparently believed that the U.S. could have it all and didn’t need to prioritize which policies were more important and which were secondary?  This is the crew that thought it could expand NATO twice in five years and recognize Kosovo, all the while berating Russia for its internal political conditions, and then ask the Russians for help with Iran as if nothing had happened.

What it says about the administration is that they look at each problem in isolation, ignoring its possible repercussions elsewhere. It's why they have no problem supporting Kosovo breaking away from Serbia, but refuse to acknowledge any suggestion of the same right for the Georgian enclaves, while likely to take an opposing line once again should Chechnya start feeling its oats once again.

Well, enough ranting. The next couple of days should tell us a great deal more, and it should be very interesting to see if the Russians will take their victory and go home, or push beyond the rational endpoint and get sucked into a drawn-out insurgency. (And frankly, if they push it that far, it would serve them right.)

In other news of note, Daniel Nexon has a good post on the Ukrainian threat regarding the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and LGM has possible news of an American being captured helping the Georgian forces.

Musharraf on the way out?

By BJ

Britain's Telegraph is reporting that the Pakistani army leadership is advising the President that he should step down rather than face impeachment.

The civilian government intensified an attritional, seven-month long power struggle with the presidency when it announced earlier this week that it is to begin impeachment proceedings against Mr Musharraf on Monday.

The twin arbiters of power in Pakistan, the army chief of staff, Gen Ashfaq Kiyani, and America, which has provided dollars 12 billion in military aid to the country in the last six years, have publicly declared themselves to be neutral on Pakistan's domestic politics.

However a senior official from the ruling government coalition partner, the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) said that the army has "whispered in Musharraf's ear that it is time to leave".

"Over the next few days they will make it clear to him [Musharraf] that a protracted battle [against impeachment] is not in Pakistan's interests," he added.

If true, it could mean the end, (or at least a temporary suspension), of the power struggle that has kept Pakistan's leadership occupied while the situation in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan have spiraled further out of control.

More than 100 militants have been killed in four days of heavy fighting in a tribal area near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, officials say.

Pakistan said nine of its soldiers were killed in the battles in Bajaur.

Fighter jets, helicopter gunships and artillery were all reportedly used to pound the militants' positions in the strategically important area.

The Pakistani Taleban say that only seven of their men died. Neither claim has been independently verified.

. . .

Bajaur civilians were evacuated as fighting raged over control of a strategically important post near the Afghan border.

On Friday the security forces - members of the frontier corps - pulled back from the position.

They moved to Khar, the main town in the Bajaur tribal agency, to where the Taleban are reported to have followed them.

The militants have now surrounded the town, according to a government official in Khar, who spoke to the BBC's Urdu service on condition of anonymity.

Whether or not a Musharraf-less Pakistani government will actually change a whole lot in the border territories is debatable, to say the least, but it should at least make the highly brittle country a little less likely to violently splinter apart.

Sunday Morning Georgia-Russia Thread

By BJ

First, it behooves me to pass on the advice of Joshua Foust, who says that in the midst of all of the confusing claims and counter-claims, we should ignore the day-to-day stuff, and also bloggers. He's quite right that nobody has a good handle on all of the minutiae and won't for several days unless and until some decent unbiased observers can be found to get into the region and start verifying some of the claims. It's quite good advice.

However, if you're like me and find your inner "War Nerd" coming to the fore and just have to get your fix of coverage, read on.

A good place to start is Robert Farley's last evening's update and this morning's. Of note is this linked analysis of the Putin-Medvedev power play. I said when this started that we would likely get an answer to who was actually running the show in Russia. So far the answer seems to be Putin, and a successful conclusion to the war in Georgia will likely give him a significant boost.

From the morning news coverage, two things immediately jumped out at me. First is what appears to be confirmation that the US will play transporter to Georgia's Iraq contingent.

The Bush administration is also arranging to transport as many as 2,000 Georgian troops back home from Iraq. Georgian forces make up the third-largest contingent in the multinational force in Iraq, after the United States and Britain.

"If [Georgian officials] request it, we will facilitate [the transfer] within a relatively short amount of time" with commercial or U.S. military aircraft, the official said. "We have communicated with the Russians what our obligations are" to Georgia.

Second is this statement by Putin:

Mr. Putin made clear that Russia now viewed Georgian claims over the breakaway regions to be invalid, and that Russia had no intention of withdrawing. “There is almost no way we can imagine a return to the status quo,” he said in remarks on Russian state television.

Add to that the mobilization of the Black Sea Fleet, the upping of troop numbers in Abhkazia, and the second front that's opened up there, and the claims of the Georgians that they've returned to their pre-Aug 6 positions in Ossetia without any let up by the Russians or any indication the Russians are going to accept the Georgians cease-fire call, (with the caveat that not all of the above information is confirmed), and one can speculate that the Russians are looking to drive Georgia completely from both regions and either annex or formally recognize their independence, even if it's unlikely anybody else will.

In any case, the Russians are now moving past the point where their actions could be justified as a proportionate response the Georgian attack. (Doesn't take very long, does it?) Not that they're likely to care much more than the Israelis did when they went disproportional on Lebanon in 2006. At this point the only thing that seems clear from the Georgians well-planned initial assault and the Russians swift counter-assault and continuing escalation is that both sides were prepared for some excuse to get the ball rolling. The Georgians lost their initial gamble and now the Russians are letting the dice roll.

Of final note, (for now), David Weman asks whether or not the US played any part in encouraging Saakashvili's gamble. Cernig already covered this angle on Friday, but it bears repeating that the Georgians may have grossly misread the amount of support the US was willing to offer, and the US did nothing to correct that misreading.

In any case, the US, and the West as a whole, finds itself singularly unable to do much about the situation now except escalate their rhetoric.

Addendum: The American Footprints crew has been doing an excellent job rounding up information links on the conflict here.

Opening a Second Front

By BJ

From the BBC:

In another development, separatists in Abkhazia - Georgia's other breakaway region - said they had launched air and artillery strikes on Georgian forces in the Kodori Gorge.

Speigel Online has posted an interview with Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba where he threatened such a second front in the war. If they have in fact carried out that threat, then Georgia's situation just got a whole lot worse.

Update:

Per the New York Times, the Georgians are claiming that Russia is poised to land troops on its coast. The lead paragraph makes it sound as though its a sure thing, but close to the bottom it becomes apparent they're merely scribing for the Georgians:

On Saturday, Russia notified Western governments that it was moving elements of its Black Sea fleet to Ochamchire, a small port in the disputed enclave, a senior Western official said.

A senior Georgian security official said that Russian ships were moving toward Georgia’s Black Sea Cost in order to land ground troops, and that 12 Russian jets were bombing the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, another breakaway region that hugs the Black Sea.

At this point I'd say that its too early to determine if Russia is indeed looking to land troops or is merely setting up for a possible blockade or even as a defensive measure. The Georgians of course wish to put the most damaging spin upon the movement, and from the article's lead and other coverage, it appears the major American press organizations are finding their sympathies lie with the US ally.

There is one other piece of note in the NYT article concerning the current fate of Tskhinvali:

Russian authorities said their forces had retaken the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, from Georgian control during the morning hours , while Georgian officials said they had withdrawn from the area voluntarily.

The Georgians had been claiming that they still controlled the capital and denying that the Russians had forced them out. It is safe to say that the claim of withdrawing voluntarily is merely face-saving rhetoric.

The Continuing War in the Caucasus

By BJ

Well, nothing like explosions and death to spark a wealth of reading material, (though as Cernig notes, apparently not as much as the infidelity of a never-really-was politician). So far the coverage seems to fall into two distinct types, those hoping to determine what is happening while taking the pronouncements of the various players with a significant helping of salt, and those with a serious anti-Russian bias who take everything the Georgian government puts out as though it were gospel. Daniel Nexon at the Duck of Minerva has a good example of the latter kind of take on the situation, (and pretty good coverage overall). At the bottom, he lays out the three main scenarios regarding the question of who is responsible for starting the whole mess.

1. The South Ossetian's provoked the conflict to draw in Russia, both Georgia and Russia took the bait;

2. The Russians orchestrated a series of provocations, Georgia took the bait;

3. Georgia decided to seize the moment to "liberate" South Ossetia and assumed that some combination of (a) western support, (b) international distraction, and (c) being able to point to South Ossetian attacks as a justification for the offensive would resolve things in their favor.

As he says, the likely truth is some combination of the three scenarios, though I lean a bit more to the third for the reasons laid out by Robert Farley:

To be a bit less muddled, I am less sympathetic to the Georgian case because I think that escalating the war (and providing an excuse for Russian counter-escalation) was a damn stupid thing for Saakashvili to do, and a remarkably damn stupid thing for him to do absent an extremely compelling cause. Small, weak states living next to abrasive, unpredictable great powers need to be extremely careful about what they do; in most cases, their foreign policy should, first and foremost, be about avoiding war with the great power. This is what Saakashvili failed to do. The war didn't need to escalate; it was a Georgian decision to move from the village skirmishes that were happening on Tuesday to the siege of Tsikhinvali on Thursday.

As another commentator once put it, you might feel bad about a guy who gets mauled by a bear, but you're likely to be less sympathetic if the guy walked up to a bear he knew was ill-tempered and started poking it with a sharp stick.

The rest of Farley's post is well worth reading, as he lays out the political and military situations, and the stakes for the players involved. Not surprisingly, now that everybody appears quite committed, the stakes are high, which makes further escalation more rather than less likely.

On the military front, Douglus Muir lays out what was likely the Georgian's intended strategy.

South Ossetia has always been vulnerable to a blitzkrieg attack. It’s small, it’s not very populous (~70,000 people), and it’s surrounded by Georgia on three sides. It’s very rugged and mountainous, yes, but it’s not suited to defense in depth. There’s only one town of any size (Tsikhinvali, the capital) and only one decent road connecting the province with Russia.

That last point bears emphasizing. There’s just one road, and it goes through a tunnel. There are a couple of crappy roads over the high passes, but they’re in dreadful condition; they can’t support heavy equipment, and are closed by snow from September to May. Strategically, South Ossetia dangles by that single thread.

So, there was always this temptation: a fast determined offensive could capture Tsikhinvali, blow up or block the tunnel, close the road, and then sit tight. If it worked, the Russians would then be in a very tricky spot: yes, they outnumber the Georgians 20 to 1, but they’d have to either drop in by air or attack over some very high, nasty mountains. This seems to be what the Georgians are trying to do: attack fast and hard, grab Tsikhinvali, and close the road.

Given the Russians appear to have gotten significant armour resources into the region to combat the Georgian forces investing Tsikhinvali, it would appear that Saakashvili's gamble has failed, and the short knockout blow the Georgians needed to score won't be forthcoming. While the short time horizon was favourable for the Georgians, the medium term is good for Russia as it can bring its far greater military weight to bear. Once that happens, it probably isn't a matter of whether Georgia will lose, but how bad the loss will be.

The fighting appears to be spreading from South Ossetia proper, with the Russian Air force bombing towns, sea ports, and military bases in Georgia proper, as well as some reports of fighting in Abkhazia, the other breakaway region of Georgia, (and the far more lucrative prize of the two).

The Russians are also finding time to blame the US for Georgia's military build up and aggression.

The U.S. is responsible for the militarisation of Georgia, providing it with finance and weapons, says Chairman of the Russia's State Duma Security Committee Vladimir Vasilyev.

“Georgia could have used the years of Saakashvili's presidency in different ways - to build up the economy, to develop the infrastructure, to solve social issues both in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the whole state. Instead, the Georgian leadership with president Saakashvili undertook consistent steps to increase its military budget from $US 30 million to $US 1 billion - Georgia was preparing for a military action,” Vasilyev also says.

While the above source is clearly biased, Wired's Danger Room put out two stories yesterday that do point out the truth behind Russia's claim. The US has been training and arming Georgian forces since 2002.

The first U.S. aid came under the rubric of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (ostensibly to counter alleged Al Qaeda influence in the Pankisi Gorge); then, under the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program. Georgia returned the favor, committing thousands of troops to the multi-national coalition in Iraq. Last fall, the Georgians doubled their contingent, making them the third-largest contributor to the coalition. Not bad for a nation of 4.6 million people.

And the Georgian view of the training might have been a bit different then the US intended.

Officially, SSOP was supposed to prepare Georgians for service in Iraq. Bu